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REVIEW: Evan Selinger (ed.), Postphenomenology: A Critical Companion to Ihde. Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2006.  
 
THE MULTISTABLE ONTOLOGY OF DON IHDE  
Ingrid Richardson, Murdoch University  
 
Over the past four decades, Ihde’s phenomenological approach has been instrumental in 
countering the traditional understanding of scientific knowledge as abstract and 
contemplative, an idea that has construed the relationship between science (as ‘originary’ 
theory) and technology (as derivative praxis) in epistemologically hierarchical terms. In this 
classical understanding, technological apparatuses are the material or instrumental 
substrate; they work to prove or provide evidence of what is already effectively known via 
contemplative reasoning, or by way of a thinking that is untainted by the secular and carnal 
fallibilities of either bodily or instrumental perception. Yet increasingly, as Ihde documents, 
experimental praxis and perception have become essential to scientific knowledge, such 
that science can be more aptly named technoscience – a term that points to the inextricable 
and irreducible relation between modern science, the tools and historically located concepts 
used to achieve that knowledge, and the body–technology relations implicit in any 
knowledge-in-the-making. Technology, for Ihde, is not an application of science. Rather, 
scientific and industrial knowledge emerges from specific body–technology couplings that in 
turn generate particular, contextual, located techno–perceptual ways of determining what 
can be known. This understanding of interpretive possibility also describes the non-neutral 
and transformative effects of techno- scientific activity, the latent epistemological and 
ontological ‘inclinations’ or ‘trajectories’ of any apparatus or device used to grasp or literally 
‘take hold’ of the world, and thus the impossibility of objectivity in scientific – or indeed any 
– knowledge.  
 
In the introduction to this collection, editor Evan Selinger provides both a biographical and 
conceptual overview of Ihde’s substantial body of work, navigating the path to his non-
foundational post-phenomenology which has effectively combined phenomenology, 
pragmatism and hermeneutics. The first section (Part I. Phenomenological Style: Ihde’s 
Unique Voice) is then devoted to a discussion of Ihde’s unique methodology, with 
contributions from Vivian Sobchack and Carl Mitcham. Sobchack’s inspirational chapter 
describes Ihde’s ‘simple grounds’ – a variational ontology wherein Ihde uses the familiarity 
and particularity of his own individual micro-perceptions and body–tool relations as a means 
to comprehend the multi-stable and macro-perceptual regularities of contemporary ways of 
being and knowing. Mitcham, who is recognised as one of the foremost philosophers of 
technology, offers an instructive history of the pragmatist tradition and its influence upon 
Ihde’s phenomenology – in particular the way in which pragmatism’s practical approach can 
be used to challenge classical phenomenology’s foundationalist, essentialist, and often a-
political pretensions.  
 
The next section (Part II. Listening to Ihde: Phenomenology and Sound) focuses on the post-
phenomenological relation between embodiment and acoustic technologies – both an early 
and recurring theme in Ihde’s work. Lenore Langsdorf reflects upon the way that Ihde’s  
‘processual and relational metaphysics’ can be used to interpret the perceptual contexts of 
the auditory dimension. Significantly, as Langsdorf notes, Ihde’s ‘second phenomenology’ 
countermands the visualist bias inherent in much of the philosophical tradition, by insisting 
that perception is always a whole-of-body experience – no single sense can be considered in 
isolation from either embodiment or circumstance. Trevor Pinch considers the medium 
specificity of sound by narrating the particular history of the synthesiser and its emergence 
within a complex socio-technical environment, and by describing how design choices in the 
development of a technology ‘afforded’ specific contexts of use and large-scale adoption of 
musical sounds. In the final contribution to this section, Judy Lochhead reiterates the theme 
of sensory holism evident in Ihde’s phenomenology, suggesting how sound can be not only 
heard but visualised, ‘sensed’, and preserved by means of a range of gestures, numbers, 
graphic symbols, models, and maps.  
 
Part III (Normative Commitments: Ihde at the Crossroads of Ethics and Politics) deals with a 
central and recurring critique levelled at phenomenology – the neglect of the normative, 
political, and ethical dimensions of the life-world. In the first essay, against the claim that 
Ihde lacks ‘normative sensitivity’, Selinger argues that Ihde’s commitment to 
phenomenological description, intentionality and the ‘fidelity of context’, critically reveals 
how both utopian and dystopian theories of technology often do not correspond to 
empirical reality. Rather, they tend to ‘correlate with selective perceptual attention’ – the 
most prevalent of these being the cultural and visualist biases of Western philosophy. In his 
chapter, Paul B. Thompson claims that although Ihde’s insights have shown (pace Heidegger) 
how tools are embodied and absorbed in the ‘noetic dimensions of intentionality’, variably 
amplifying and reducing perceptual possibility, neither Ihde nor his followers have 
effectively used post-phenomenology for ethical analysis. Peter-Paul Verbeek, well-known 
design philosopher and proponent of STS, also considers the domain of ethics. He reflects on 
how a critical understanding of technological agency can be used to articulate the material 
dimension of morality – human actions are not determined by intention alone but also by 
the material environment; tools and things co-constitute reality and thus inevitably co-shape 
morality. Post-phenomenology, therefore, must move beyond primarily descriptive accounts 
of the world and attend to the normative ‘relationality’ of being.  
 
Part 4 of Postphenomenology turns to critical appreciations of the Heidegger–Ihde 
connection. Robert C. Sharff contends that Ihde doesn’t do justice to either Heidegger or 
Merleau-Ponty, and he critiques both Ihde’s neglect of issues of gender and race, and the 
problematic body–perceptual/cultural–linguistic dualism emerging from Ihde’s recent text 
Bodies in Technology. Richard A. Cohen in his essay concurs with Ihde’s interpretation of 
technology as an ‘extension of human embodiment’ that is thoroughly embedded in socio-
cultural contexts. Returning to the theme of the previous section, Cohen contends that pure 
instrumentality divorces essence from existence, and so ignores the ‘more profound 
dimension of being-in-the-world’ – that of ethical evaluation. The final chapter in this 
section describes the Columbia Shuttle disaster with reference to Heidegger’s description of 
technological breakdown, where the working tool becomes ‘invisible’ to the user until it 
malfunctions. Followers of Ihde will recognise recurrent phenomenological themes 
concerning our immediate involvement with the ‘equipmental’ environment, and its co-
determination of the epistemic and ontic boundaries of knowledge and praxis.  
 
The fifth part of this compilation – Perceiving Bodies – contains four essays by theorists from 
distinct yet increasingly intersecting disciplines. Each engages with Ihde’s treatment of 
perception and embodiment, and several also turn to his close alignment with Merleau-
Ponty’s concept of the ‘corporeal schema’, as a way to describe the ‘polymorphous’ 
openness of the body to technological mediation. For Donna Haraway, technoscientific 
discourse is intrinsic to the way we understand our bodies, and our biology and physiology 
are increasingly articulated by a range of technological ensembles and machine visions. Her 
study of Crittercam – a TV series that featured video footage from tiny cameras mounted on 
penguins, turtles and whales – insightfully illustrates the delegation of hermeneutic and 
material agency to human, animal and machine beings, who together ‘infold to become the 
multi-sensory “flesh’’ of contemporary naturecultures’. Andrew Feenberg argues that the 
two-body model described by Ihde in Bodies and Technology (2002) doesn’t account for the 
passive dimension of embodiment. To the first ‘sensory’ body and the second ‘culturally 
shaped’ body, Feenberg adds ‘body three’ (the ‘dependent’ body acted upon by other 
humans and technologies) and ‘body four’ (the ‘extended’ body modified by technologies), 
and claims that the latter two are characterised by a specific kind of instrumentally 
embodied passivity.  
 
The third essay by Donn Welton concentrates on ‘how the body is involved with machines’, 
appending Ihde’s own critical adaptation of Merleau-Ponty in detailing how corporeal 
schema and sub- schema absorb tools into the repertoire of the body. In the final chapter, 
Andrew Pickering provides a decidedly SSK slant to Ihde’s method, maintaining that the 
centrality of the human body in Ihde’s phenomenology, and its concomitant situatedness, 
makes ontological symmetry between human and non-human impossible. Pickering uses the 
term ‘ontological engine’ to describe how machines can help us to think about ontology, 
‘rather than deceiving us about epistemology’. That is, they can show us not just how we 
represent the world but how we ‘get along materially’. In this respect, he argues, humans 
are not in an ontologically privileged position.  
 
Part 5, entitled Framing Science, is concerned with how Ihde’s work, and philosophy of 
technology more generally, has provided conceptual tools for the critical interpretation of 
scientific knowledge-making. In the first essay, Robert P. Crease proposes that the concept 
of ‘performance’ can offer both a hermeneutic and phenomenological framework for 
understanding experimental science, and discusses the particular case of IBM’s Blue Gene 
project (which aimed to construct a computer capable of simulating the complex process of 
protein folding). Finn Olesen’s chapter utilises Ihde’s account of technical mediation to 
frame questions surrounding the application of high-tech solutions in health care. Olesen 
considers, following Ihde, how ‘subjects and artifacts constitute each other in praxis’ and 
documents the non-neutral transformative effects of techno–acoustic amplification upon 
the diagnostic pro- cess. In the third essay, Albert Borgmann identifies one of Ihde’s most 
important ongoing contributions: revealing the irreducible and ontological multi-stability of 
everyday culture. Indeed, as Ihde notes in his concluding chapter, Borgmann insightfully 
points to the way in which multi-stability is Ihde’s ontology, replacing ‘the notion of 
essences in classical phenomenology’. Finally, Hans Lenk addresses the actual and potential 
links between philosophy of science and philosophy of technology, and argues that the 
former might benefit from an ‘action-oriented’ model of knowledge-making. This anti-
theoreticist approach, Lenk comments, is exemplified by Ihde’s efforts to incorporate 
instrumental realism into the philosophies of science and technology.  
 
The book finishes with a generous and considered response from Ihde to many of the 
themes and concerns raised by his nineteen readers–critics. In its entirety, this quite 
exceptional collection illustrates the broad inter-disciplinarity of Ihde’s thinking, and the way 
in which his relational and multi-stable ontology can fruitfully ‘speak’ to so many theoretical 
perspectives about technology and science.  
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